I haven’t really posted anything for a while because I’ve been reading so much. I suppose, though, that this would be a good reason to post something, sniff sniff. In reality, however, I’ve really been cramped for free time lately. I’m working quite a bit, and only able to get about an hour of reading in per day, and at about 5-10 minutes per page or so (when I’m reading dense theology or philosophy), things go a bit slow. Currently, I’m reading Jonathan Edwards’ A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections. I’ve read a good deal of philosophical theology in my day, but this book by Edwards is one of the most philosophically precise I’ve ever read. It’s like I’m reading the Puritan Summa Theologica on affections. Anyhow, a very impressive book to say the least, even if it’s not the most entertaining read.

The second book, which I just started (for the second time), is Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief. This is Plantinga’s third volume in his trilogy on the notion of warrant, which he defines as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. Plantinga basically moves from his epistemological theory of warrant, as developed in his previous volumes which are purely philosophical epistemology, and examines whether theistic belief, specifically Christian belief, can enjoy warrant. He says it does, of course!

During my reading this morning, I came across an interesting passage from the preface of the book where Plantinga lays out his thesis and explains the gist of his book. Here’s his comment:

Some thinkers (often citing the authority of the great eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel Kant) argue that we couldn’t so much as think about such a being as the Christian God, infinite and transcendent as he is supposed to be. That is because our all-too-human concepts could not apply to such a being; our concepts can apply only to finite beings, beings who are not transcendent in the way Christians take God to be. But if it is really true that our concepts cannot apply to an infinite and transcendent being, if we cannot so much as think about such a being, then we human beings also have no beliefs about such a being. Indeed, we can’t have beliefs about such a being, but in fact they are mistaken….I argue that there is no reason at all to accept this skeptical claim: Kant himself provides no reason, and those contemporaries who appeal to his authority certainly do no better.

Plantinga goes on to flush (take that word whichever way you want) this Kantian myth of the transcendent out in his first chapter. It would be too long to go into here, but Plantinga’s book, so far, is still intriguing. I’ll post more on it tomorrow—hopefully.

4 Responses to “So much to read, so much to do, and not enough time…”

1. Geoff says:

   May 12, 2009 at 1:46 pm

   This sounds interesting… I wonder if Plantinga is making a mistake though, setting up belief as subject to thought. Maybe he defines his terms in the book (which I haven’t read) but is it really necessary to assume that we can’t believe until we think about something? And even if that were true (which I’m willing to concede), doesn’t thinking have to assume developing a coherent philosophical concept about something? Is that what P is trying to say? That seems a bit presumptuous — but, of course, Plantinga is an analytic philosopher!
2. Geoff says:

   May 12, 2009 at 1:47 pm

   whoops… the question should say: “DOES thinking have to assume developing a coherent philosophical concept…?”
3. phil says:

   May 14, 2009 at 9:53 am

   Ummm, you’re probably going to have to give Plantinga the benefit of the doubt on this one, Geoff. I’m still reading his points so it would likely take me longer to respond to your question relative to my ability to flush it out in a short blog post. However, that said, I’m going to keep your point in mind in my further readings. I think, though, what Plantinga’s saying in what I’ve quoted is that the Kant monkeys have presuppositionally excluded “God talk” by the very syllogistic nature of their arguments. And they’ve given no justification for doing so. That’s his point.

   Regarding Plantinga, keep in mind (as you know) that he’s one of the most respected epistemologists in recent history–and that includes religious epistemology as well as general philosophical epistemology.

   On your jest of Plantinga being an analytic philosopher, he is typically regarded as one. However, I think this designation might be too easy of a classification for such a complex thinker. Plantinga has made inroads into virtually all camps of philosophy. Remember Stiver’s lecture that included Plantinga? hehe.

   BTW: will you be auditing Stiver’s other philosophical theology class. That might be fun.
4. Geoff says:

   May 15, 2009 at 12:21 pm

   True, he shouldn’t be pigeon-holed… I do like to generalize! But, in any case, I am really curious to read that book… I like Plantinga a lot, and my guess is he’s saying something quite nuanced, I just didn’t know what his presuppositions were here. Unfortunately, I have to read quite a few other books before I can get to WCB! As for Stiver’s class, there’s a chance I may be TA’ing that! We’ll see… I think it’s actually the same as what we took.

   Have a good weekend!